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Brown: Nuclear
Ship Savannah and the Law
NOTES
NUCLEAR SHIP SAVANNAH AND THE LAW
The world's first nuclear-powered merchant ship, the NS Savannah, is tentatively scheduled to make Jacksonville, Florida her third
port of call, following sea trials which are expected to be completed
in late July or early August of 1962.1 The Jacksonville debut will
follow visits to Savannah, Georgia and New York City, but will
precede the Savannah's September 30th appearance in Seattle for the
World's Fair, unless "test delays" 2 force schedule changes. The Washington news release which announced this schedule implied that
both Jacksonville and the State of Florida should feel honored by
the priority accorded them, and suggested that a gala event is in
order. 3 The lawyer, long-trained to look beneath the roseate surface,
may find his enthusiasm tinged with a trace of habitual tough-minded
skepticism. His mind may range, computor-like, through myriad subconscious notations, linking a number of them into a chain of questions, answered, answerable, moot, routine, unique, applicable or
remote to his homestead of practice. News items discussing SL-1,
accidental criticality, WVindscale, and Holy Loch may couple with
professional articles and citations, such as P.R.D.C. v. International
Union,4 Price-Anderson, 5 NELIA, 6 MAELU, 7 and the Atomic Energy

Act.8 Periodic references to negotiations for the Savannah's entry
into foreign ports, 9 indicating progress but less than rapid culmination, may suggest speculation not only as to the delay, but as to why
negotiations are even necessary. The mere fact of the Price-Anderson
Act,10 its unique, prodigious indemnity figure of $500 million surmounting the greatest single risk coverage (itself an impressive $60

1. As this note went to press it was announced that the Savannah's early
visit to Jacksonville had been cancelled and that the ship would undergo two
months of "intensive overhaul and investigation" at Galveston, Texas. Florida
Times-Union, Sept. 1, 1962, p. 31, col. 1. Unintentional reactor shutdown by the
automatic controls while underway, Florida Times-Union, Aug. 20, 1962, p. 1,
col. 7, and malfunction of the ship's stabilizers, Florida Times-Union, Aug. 29, 1962,
p. 6, col. 3, may have contributed to the schedule change.
2. Florida Times-Union, May 26, 1962, p. 23, col. 3.
3. Ibid.
4. Power-Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elect., Radio and Mach.
Workers, AFL-CIO, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
5. 71 Stat. 576 (1957), U.S.C. §2210 (1958).
6. Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association.
7. Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters.
8. 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§2011-2296 (1958).
9. E.g., USAEC, MAJOR AcrivITIES IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, JAN.-DEC.
1961, 229 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1961 USAEC MAJOR ACTIvITIEs].
10. See note 5 supra. For an excellent discussion see Bangs, The Price Anderson Act: A Half-Billion Dollars of Federal Indemnity, 47 A.B.A.J. 1178 (1961)

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

1

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 15, Iss.
2 [1962],
Art. 8
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEfV
million)" ever provided by the insurance industry, may shade in
omnious portents the sober reflection it engenders. When the Savannah eases into port, the lawyer may speculate whether, among the
signals whipping from her halyards, there should be those alerting
to stand-by status practitioners in the fields of torts, admiralty, insurance, and conflicts. And he may wonder, as he must have done
many times before, whether a challenge is emerging which may escape
the undefined reaches of preventive law.
DELIBERATIONS ON STRATEGY

The emergence of the "Nuclear Age" has created enigmas great
and small. While those great must be wrestled with by premiers and
presidents, perhaps the ultimate solutions will be realized on a lower
level of detail, through adaptation, study, testing, and the evolutionary
processes of the law. There are those who claim, however, that the
law cannot afford the continued luxury of progress by adaptation and
counter-action to the extremities of human behavior. Some suggest
that the law must be indexed, card-punched, and fed into computers,
to arm it with a never-before available prescience requisite to keeping
pace with scientific advancement. Respected scholars express attitudes of reappraisal. Professor Leo A. Huard, who wrote with 'Mr.
Ralph E. Becker in 1955,12
"The advent of the Atomic Age will scarcely cause a ripple on
the even surface of the principles of tort liability. Lawyers
can rely with confidence on all the familiar doctrines and precepts. These will remain unchanged."
had, through change which he "attributed to three years of selfeducation,"'' revised his thinking by December of 1958 to the extent
4
that he wrote:'
[hereinafter cited as Bangs]. Some suggestion of the significance of Price-Anderson
indennity coverage is to be found in the estimate that the Chamizal section of
El Paso, Texas, an area of 83 city blocks, has an approximate value of $500,000,000.
U.S. News and World Report, July 16, 1962, p. 6.
11. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 91 (1957) (statement of Charles J. Hough, Vice-Pres., Traveler's Ins. Co.).
12. Becker & Huard, Tort Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry, 44
GEo. L.J. 58, 76 (1955).
13. Huard, The Lawyei's Duties and Responsibilities in the Nuclear Age, 12
\'AND. L. REV. 1 (1958).
14. Id. at 2. In like vein, Robert B. Von Mehiren cautioned the American
Branch of the International Law Association: "[T]he human disciplines have
not been able to keep pace with the acceleration of the scientific disciplines. ...
[NW]hile science has gone forward on seven-league boots, law has lagged behind.
Are we as a profession ready to deal with the complicated legal and institutional
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"We cannot shirk the task of accomodating nuclear industry
and the law ....

[W]e must abandon the. professional smug-

ness which has all too often characterized our ancient and
honorable calling.

.

.

. We will have to overcome the vast

inertia of accumulated precepts and demonstrate a willingness
to embark on new ways. We must conquer our regrettable
tendency to force the new square peg into the old round hole,
because in nuclear energy we have a square peg of hitherto
unimagined dimensions. It simply will not fit into our pretailored round holes no matter how elastic such holes have
proved in the past."
With more specific reference to maritime applications of nuclear
energy, Mr. E. Robert Seavers, General Counsel for the Federal Maritime Board, has advised: 15
"The application of atomic power to the propulsion of ships
has created a unique and challenging series of legal and economic issues. Existing legal principles do not supply all the
answers. The field is unique in that it is not an area in which
the customary development of case law can be permitted gradually to follow the development of technical progress. Instead,
due to the special nature of the risks involved, the use by private industry of this great source of power for shipping will
be impeded, if not prevented, until the broad legal principles
governing responsibility for nuclear damage are established
and made uniform among at least the major maritime nations.
The welcome of nuclear vessels in foreign ports will be facilitated by agreement on these principles."
Discussing proceedings at the June 1960 London conference which
developed revisions in SOLAS,16 Mr. Seavers informed the ABA
Committee on Marine and Inland Insurance Law that a new chapter,
covering safety standards for nuclear-powered ships, had been accepted. The new chapter requires that nations that are to be visited
by non-military nuclear ships must be furnished, within a time reasonably calculated to allow them to evaluate the safety of the vessels,
both a particularized safety assessment and an operating manual
problems created by nuclear energy? . . . I doubt it .... ." Von Mehren, The
Development and Use of Nuclear Power- Some Reflections on Legal Problems,
ATOMIC ENERGY L.J. 3, 12 (1959).
15. Seavers, The Impact of Nuclear Propulsion of Ships on Admiralty and
Shipping Laws, ABA, PROCEEDINGS, SEC. OF INS., N. & C.L. 178 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Seavers].
16. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 10, 1948,
T.I.A.S. No. 2495, 164 U.N.T.S. 113.
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covering each ship. It also authorizes "special control",-, on the
part of the host nation before the nuclear ship may enter port.
Mr. Seavers suggested that liability principles devised for nuclear
shipping must satisfy not only the theoretically credible risks, but also
those, which though only chimerical, are nonetheless real in the minds
of those exposed to such ships, and indicated that until adequate risk
distribution and coverage are developed by maritime nations, neither
the public in the port cities nor private industry will welcome the
hazards incident to nuclear propulsion of vessels. He reasoned:"'
"If multilateral agreement is needed on liabilities of shorebased reactors, then a fortiori it is needed in the field of nuclear ships. Reactors on land are located in remote areas with
a view to minimizing the damage in the event of a nuclear
incident. Merchant vessels must, by the nature of their use,
call at congested port areas .. "
Mr. Seavers referred to the NS Savannah as a contrivance bearing
inherent capacity to inflict catastrophic damage. He explained that
such a catastrophe, though unlikely, could inflict injury and damage
over a widespread and unsuspecting area, and that the unique nature
of such injuries often might deny knowledge of exposure to the
victim until the harmful effects occurred years later. Proof ot
causation consequently will present problems answerable only by
special principles governing liability.l, :
In 1958, Congress revealed its concern by specifically extending
to the Savannah the coverage provided by the Price-Anderson amendment20 to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This indemnification, insofar as the Savannah is concerned, covers her designers, builders and
operators, and extends to incidents occurring in foreign jurisdictions,
but it has been specifically noted "that this legislation [is] not to be
considered as precedent setting for later nuclear merchant ships."21
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Atomic Energy Act of 195422 has as one of its aims the encouragement of "widespread participation in the development and
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Seavers
Seavers
Seavers
71 Stat.
USAEC

179.
182.
187.
576 (1957), 12 U.S.C. §2210 (Supp. 1959).
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS,

INDEMNIF1CATION

OF

1958-59, at 7 (1959) (report to J.C.A.E. on Operations
tinder §170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [hereinafter cited as 1959 REACTOR
ATOMIC ENERGY AcTIVITIES,
SAFEGUARDS REPORT].

22.

68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§2011-2296 (1958).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss2/8
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utilization of Atomic energy for peaceful purposes

.....

23

After

some enthusiastic initial activity, private industry made a reappraisal.
Some companies concluded that despite the considerable investment
already made 24 and notwithstanding the private insurance pools of
MAELU and NELIA,2 5 which together provided $60,000,000 in single
risk indemnity coverage, they would be obligated to suspend activity
in the nuclear field unless massive additional liability protection was
supplied by the federal government.2 6 Against this background,
Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act of 1957, designed to "encourage the development of the atomic energy industry" and to "protect the public" from the consequences of "nuclear incidents."27
Under this act reactor licensees are required to obtain certain private initial financial protection satisfactory to the AEC.2 8 Once this
prerequisite has been met, AEC obligations attach and, under indemnity agreements executed with the reactor licensees, provide an
additional one-half billion dollars of protection.2 This protection
covers not only the licensees, but also their suppliers, subcontractors,
designers, and any other persons who may be liable, against public
liability claims which exceed the amount of private financial protection possessed by the licensee.30 Expressly excluded from the definition of "public liability" are licensee reactor-site employees who are
eligible to file claims under state or federal workmen's compensation
acts, and claims arising out of acts of war.31
If, upon the occurrence of a major reactor disaster, it becomes
apparent to the commission that the total damages will probably
exceed the total indemnity coverage, the statute provides for apportionment of claims.32 In such a situation,' the AEC or any person

23. 68 Stat. 922 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §2013 (d) (1958).
24. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 147, 156 (1957) (testimony of Francis K. McCune, Vice-Pres. of Gen. Elec. Co.).
25. See Bangs 1178; MAELU will accept 22.5 per cent of the losses incurred
up to its limit of $13,500,000, while NELIA will accept up to 77.5 per cent of
the losses incurred up to its limit of S46,500,000. 1959 REacTOR SAFEGUARDS REPORT
3.
26. Bangs 1178; see note 24 supra, at 156.
27. 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §2012 (i) (1958).
28. USAEC, MAJOR AcTIvITIES IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAMS, JAN.-DEc.
1960, 399-403 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1960 USAEC MAJOR Acrn'ITIES]; see 10
C.F.R. §§140.11-.12 (Supp. 1962). The protection required will usually be acquired
through one or both of the insurance pools, see note 25 supra; 1961 USAEC
MAJOR

ACTIVITIEs 231.

29. See 71 HARV. L. REv. 750
in this protection).
30. 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42 U.S.C.
31. 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42 U.S.C.
32. 71 Stat. 577 (1957), 42 U.S.C.

(1958) (discussing some gaps and weak spots
§2210 (a), (c) (1958).
§2014 (u) (1958).
§2210 (e) (1958).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

5

UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
REVIEW
Florida Law Review,
Vol. 15, Iss.LAW
2 [1962],
Art. 8

indemnified may apply to the appropriate United States district
court, to have the claims apportioned. 33 The procedure then permits
apportionment of payments to claimants, partial payment before
settlement and setting aside part of the available funds for injuries
discovered at a later time.34 If it appears probable that the United
States will be required to make any payments under the indemnity
agreements, the AEC is authorized to settle claims on a "fair and

reasonable basis." 35 The act requires the AEC to make maximum
use of "the facilities and services of private insurance organizations"36
if the disaster occurs. There is no attempt to take the determination
of tort liability from the states, some of which may not recognize strict
liability.'- In actions which could arise simultaneously in several
states from one nuclear accident, differing results might be determined,
just as disparities would also appear under workmen's compensation
treatment in various states. It has been suggested, therefore, that a
federal compensation board be established for nuclear accidents, on
the theory that atomic energy is a national asset, and its contingent
liabilities are also national in scope. Under such a plan, the right
of the injured party to recover would be based solely upon the test
of whether the claimant was injured by radiation. Because of the
extremely wide area which radiation risks can cover, no fine line can
be drawn between employees of the user of atomic energy and third
persons, and it has been recommended that recovery should be
available to all those who are exposed and receive injuries, regardless
of their physical relationship to the site of the accident. " s
The effectiveness of such a plan might be tempered by the fact
that the very scientific data on which it must be based are tentative
and subject to reappraisal in the light of time and experience. The
ABA Committee on International Control of Atomic Energy, reported
in 1958:3 "
"[No establishment of uniform standards on reactor design,
construction and operation has yet proved possible. In the
United States these questions are considered on a case-b)case basis, as a part of a system of licensing, and presumabl)
33. 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §2012(i) (1958). The appropriate court is
the court which has venue in bankruptcy over the site of the nuclear incident.
Site is defined as the place where the mishap occurred, not where the damage
was inflicted. See S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1957).
34. 71 Stat. 578 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §2210(e) (1958).

35.

71 Stat. 578 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §2210 (h) (1958).

36.

71 Stat. 578 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §2210(g) (1958).

37.

See 71 HARV. L.

RFV.

750, 752 (1958).

38.

See Note, Problems of Tort Liability Arising ftoin Nuclear Reactors, 27
U. CINc. L. Rrv. 415, 417 (1958).
39. ABA, PROCIFDI\NrS, SFC. OF [NI'L - (:OMP. L. 9 (Supt). 1958).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss2/8

6

NO TES
Brown: Nuclear
Ship Savannah and the Law

the International Agency, Euratom, and O.E.E.C. will be constrained to follow the same procedure. . . . [TIhe formulation
of adequate and up to date ... controls will necessitate strik-

ing a balance between standards so rigorous that daily operations and technological development will be unduly retarded
and standards so limited or lax that the public safety will be
jeopardized.... If established standards are not adequate, the
actual occurrence of a nuclear incident may well lead to the
imposition of far more stringent controls than if the regulations had been sufficient in the first place."
To meet the need to fashion adequate constraints while granting
sufficient license, the Office of Atomic Development of the State of
New York contracted with Ebasco Services, Inc., for a study of various
aspects of dealing with radioactive sources and nuclear-propelled
vessels in the New York ports. The first report of its type in the
United States, the 169 page survey anticipates that about 65 naval
and civilian nuclear vessels will probably be operating by 1975, requiring about 400 refuelings and other major servicings during the
1970-1975 period.40 It predicts that about 70 per cent of the fueling,
refueling and servicing of United States and foreign nuclear ships
can be expected to be accomplished on the East Coast. The report
indicates that construction and initial fuel loading of nuclear ships
can be handled by any shipyard equipped to build and fit out conventional ships of comparable size. It advises that embarkation and
debarkation of passengers and freight, and routine servicing normal
to port operations will not require major modification of equipment or practice to accommodate nuclear ships. But it predicts that
a substantial addition to port facilities would be required to handle
refueling procedures.4'
The Ebasco Report states that there is either little or no nuclear
hazard associated with nuclear ships until reactor power levels are
42
attained. As a result, the report concludes that,
"Assuming a high quality of regulatory control, there appears
to be no reason why the construction, initial fueling, start-up,
in-port navigation, and routine servicing of nuclear vessels
cannot readily be performed with due assurance of the public
health and safety in any harbor . . . physically capable of

handling these functions."

40.

EBASCO SERVICES INC., NUCLEAR

PORT SURVEY

OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK,

39, 43 (1961).

41. Id. at 46.
42. Id. at 5.
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With certain precautionary methods, the report adds, nuclear ships
of the power level of the NS Savannah and larger can receive major

servicing and refueling in the State of New York, including the Port
of New York, without undue hazard to health and property.
TECHNOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF RISK

To form a proper perspective from which to view the risks incident to the presence of a nuclear-powered ship in the midst of one's
city, a passing contact with certain technological factors is necessary.
Perhaps those who view these proposed experimental port visitations
with increasing chagrin have ground to question whether the alleged
benefits outweigh the possible hazards.
While it is generally recognized that power reactors are not capable
of producing an explosion of the atom bomb type, either a nuclear
runaway or a coolant failure, or other possible occurrences, can produce a mixing of chemicals in the reactor which could result in aI
violent explosion.'' In spite of all precautions such an explosion can
occur, in which event the reactor vessel may be disrupted, allowing
dispersion of fission products outside the reactor. For this reason,
the reactor itself is enclosed in a containment vessel or building
which is designed to withstand whatever violent event may occur
within the reactor, and to contain whatever radiation may escape
from the reactor core. 4 ' Even if this containment is completeli
successful, however, there is some radiation "shine or leakage
which can have deleterious effects on the outside of the structure,"
which is one of the reasons for considering reactor locations that
are separated from neighboring populations by an "exclusion area
45
belt."
Dr. C. Rogers McCullough, while Chairman of the AdvisorN
Committee on Reactor Safeguards of the AEC warned that "a discussion of the unknowns in reactor safety could be lengthy indeed,'' ,

-13. Green, The Law of Reaclor Safety, 12 Vxm..

L. Ri v. 115 (1958-59).

-1-1.
Id. at 118. For descriptions of the elaborate shielding and containment
structures provided to house the Savannah's reactor, see Seavers supra note 15, at
181; Villiers, Aboard the N.S. Savannah, 122 NATIONAL GEOCRAPiIc 280, 291

(1962).

45. Green, supra note 43, at 118. The matter of reactor location was at issue
in the case of P.R.D.C. v. International Union, supra note 4, which is the only
adversary proceeding to arise in more than seventy licenses granted by the AEC
since 1954. The decision settled only the relatively minor point that the AEC, in
issuing a provisional permit for construction of a reactor for the generation of
electric power, does not have to make the same definitive finding of safety of
operation which it must make prior to licensing actual operation of the facilitN.
16. McCullough, Rearto Safety, Nucleonics, Sept. 1957, p. 136.
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"We must recognize that the only way to
[Liet me warn
you that we must expect accidents .... "
Similarly, in 1958, after pointing out that a large reactor's potential for release of radioactive content was "comparable to that
of a hydrogen bomb," and perhaps more dangerous in that the reactor's discharge would be at ground level rather than lifted into
the atmosphere by an explosion, 48 Dr. Edward Teller and Dr.
40
Albert L. Latter wrote:
and, in 1956, he advised,

be absolutely safe is not to build a reactor at all ....

"In the extensive operation of many reactors in the United
States no one has yet been killed by the radioactivity. This
has been due to extremely careful operation and also to good
luck. We must be prepared that sooner or later accidents will
occur. On the other hand we must try to take sufficient precautions to avoid the ...

catastrophic accident ....

In general

a power station is less likely to give trouble than a moving
power source. It is not probable that nuclear locomotives will
ever be safe. In nuclear ships more room is available and
more room permits more safety measures. But even so the
safety of nuclear motors in ships will have to be considered
particularly carefully because ships will have accidents in
harbors."
In 1957, in connection with further Congressional consideration
of indemnity legislation, the AEG sponsored a major study5O of the
probability and extent of a serious reactor accident. The report
stated that in most of the theoretical accidents considered, the "total
assumed losses would not exceed a few hundred million dollars." In
addition, it was estimated that the probability of an accident which
would significantly affect the public ranged from one chance in
100,000 to one chance in 1,000,000,000 per year for each large reactor.

47. Atomic Energy Forum Inc., A Forum Report: Management, Economics
and Technology for the Atomic Industry, No. 1, 169, 173 (1956).
48. "The nuclear explosive lifts most of its radioactive products to a high
altitude and the poisonous activity gets dispersed and diluted before it descends.
The activity from a reactor on the other hand will remain close to the ground
and might endanger the lives of the people in an even greater territory." TELLER
& LATrER, OUR NUCLEAR FUTURE 154 (1958).
49. TELLER & LiTrER, op. cit. supra note 48, at 158. This was written prior

to the SL-I accident when three men died as the result of an explosion and
radiation exposure which took place on January 3, 1961; see text at notes 66-68
infra.
50. USAEC, Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in
Large Nuclear Power Plants, CCH ATo,c ENERGY L. REP., 4 036 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Brookhaven Report].

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

9

LA2 IT"
REVIEIW
OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY
Florida Law Review,
Vol. 15, Iss.
[1962],
Art. 8

The report estimated that if 100 power reactors were operating in
the United States, under the most pessimistic assumptions, there
would be less than one chance in 50,000,000 of a given person being
killed in any year by a reactor accident.
Just a brief consideration of these figures indicates that the
probability basis used encompasses a spread in odds of one to 10,000
which, to say the least, does not provide a convincing basis on which
to evaluate risks, particularly since it refers to one reactor for one
year. If there are 100 reactors, then by these AEC estimates, one
person in 1,000 could be "significantly affected" per year, which
could, based on present United States population, cause the nation's
lawyers to contemplate the additional work load which 180,000
nuclear accident claims per year would create. Admittedly this is
playing fast and loose with figures. But the AEC appears to expect
the public to be satisfied with such figures as a basis for accepting its
judgment on the wisdom of placing the PRDC reactor within thirt)
miles of Detroit and Toledo, or on the advisability of berthing the
Savannah in downtown Jacksonville.
When the report referred to the "100 reactors," it shifted comparison from "members of the public significantly affected" to the
chance of a given person being killed in any year by a reactor accident. Based on present population, even this comparison assumes
some deaths ever), year. Furthermore, there is never any assurance
that the major occurrence against which the odds are predicated will
take place at the end of the chain of probability. More likely, since
we are still in the experimental stage, it will occur at the link of the
chain where "inevitably, as more and more reactors are built and
used, familiarity will breed some degree of contempt for the dangers."5'
If, though chances are "exceedingly small" and "remote,' '5 a
major reactor accident should occur, what could be the results? The
AEC, in a hearing on the indemnity legislation question, presented
figures in May 1956 indicating that in the event of a runaway reactor
and consequent release of 100 per cent of the fission products
therefrom, property damage alone could run as high as S900,000,000,
while personal injuries would force the figure much higher. Such
high estimates were predicated on the possible necessity of evacuating
large cities or major watershed areas.53
51. Hearings Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Appropriations on Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1957, 84th Cong., 2d Sess..

239 (1956).
52. Brookhaven Report 4036.
53. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energ,. Governmental
Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 53-54 (1956).
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The AEG "Brookhaven Report" in 1957 included a detailed appraisal of the maximum damage which could credibly be caused by
an accident in a typical power reactor. Under "pessimistic" assumptions, it was theorized that in such a single accident (1) as many as
3,400 persons might be killed, and 43,000 injured; (2) property
damage might range from $500,000 to $7 billion; (3) people might be
killed at distances up to 15 miles and injured at distances up to 45
miles; and (4) land contamination might extend even greater distances. 54 Such computations as these justify arguments for locating
54. Brookhaven Report 114036. See 27 CONSUMER REPORTS, 8, 11 (Jan. 1962)
showing a chart indicating theoretical results of a 30,000 megaton nuclear attack
on the United States, and indicating graphically the extent of Strontium 90 soil
contamination which could be expected to result. The chart shows that 6,000
to 8,000 millicuries of Strontium 90 per square mile could be deposited on Florida.
This would amount to from 10 to 12 microcuries per acre.
Dr. A. T. Wallace, Geneticist and Head, Plant Science Unit, Agricultural
Experiment Station, University of Florida, appearing as guest lecturer on May 9,
1962 before a Seminar class in Peacetime Applications of Atomic Energy conducted by Professor K. Krastin, at the College of Law, used the Consumer Reports
figures to illustrate the seriousness of soil contamination. Assuming that Florida
has 1,000 pounds of exchangeable calcium per acre in its soil, Dr. Wallace showed
that, given the Consumer Reports fallout figures, the ratio of Strontium 90 to
calcium in the soil would be in the vicinity of 20,000 micromicrocuries to 1 gram
of calcium. Disregarding the reduction created by the discriminating factors
attributable to various plants and animals which would absorb the Strontium 90
initially from the soil, an ingestion of one gram of calcium per day per individual
diet would result in 20,000 micromicrocuries of Strontium 90 becoming a part of
the daily diet. Using a representative ratio of discrimination effect of 1/10 the
secondary absorption by human beings of plant foods or milk originating in
contaminated acreage, would still approximate 2,000 micromicrocuries of Strontium
90 per gram of ingested calcium. The theoretically permissible daily dietary limit
of Strontium 90 has been established as 100 micromicrocuries.
Dr. Wallace stated that there is no known way to decontaminate soil, and
that unless contamination is avoided through some dependable means of protective covering, the only safe way to reclaim contaminated soil is to remove the
top two to four inches. Since this also removes most of the necessary minerals,
an available supply of uncontaminated fertilizer would then have to be applied
to regain fertility. The contaminated soils which would be removed, representing
in the neighborhood of one million pounds per acre, would have to be relocated
in such a way that washback could not recontaminate reclaimed land. Considering
that the half-life of Strontium 90 is approximately 28 years, one is driven to the
conclusion that natural decontamination offers few benefits over mechanical procedures. Survivors of such an attack would hardly be able to stretch stockpiled
foods to the point of replenishment.
But other applications can be made with this information. The problem of
land contamination assumes perspective when one reads Professor Leo A. Huard's
statement, citing the Brookhaven Report at 35 that "the fission product inventory,
in Strontium 90 alone, of a 100,000 ekw reactor has been described as comparable
to 3.8 megatons of fission weapons." Huard, The Lawyer's Duties and Responsibilities in the Nuclear Age, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (1958).
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land-based reactors in sparsely populated areas55 in spite of increased
electric transmission costs.5 ' But if isolation is necessary for a landbased reactor, a fortiori a marine reactor must be viewed askance while
it is in a congested port area.
5
The Gomberg ReportL
submitted by PRDC as part of its case
before the AEC also dealt with the effects of a maximum credible
reactor accident, its subject being a 300 Megawatt s reactor at Lagoona
Beach, Michigan. Certain factual data were assumed as a working
hypothesis for this report, including the factor of all persons in the
subject area being exposed without shelter on a hot summer night.
Radiation levels considered were as follows:3 "
(1) 25 roentgens: an emergency level which, while undesirable, may be justified for emergency rescue work or similar conditions.
(2) 150 roentgens: at this level there will be some nausea
and significant symptoms.
(3) 450 roentgens: at this level one half of the exposed
population can be expected to die.
Three basic weather conditions were considered, a weak lapse, a
strong lapse, and a weather inversion.6
Under the relatively infrequent"' inversion condition, the report
indicated that with all fission products of a gaseous nature and with
a 4.5 m.p.h. wind, a total integrated beta and gamma dose under a
100 per cent release would give twenty-four hour exposure results as
follows: 6 '

55.

Seavers 182.

56.

ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FoRUMi, INC.,

(.t5SSION

57.

AND COMMENTS ON
GOMIBERG,

SURROUNDING
.rMOSPUFRE

BASSEIr

POPULATION

SITING OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS,

SAFTIY CONSIDERATIONS
9:

VELEZ,

OF AN

REPORT

ASSUMED

FROMt A 300 MEGAWATr

ON

RELEASE

7
THE

DIS-

(1959).
POSSIBLE

OF FISSION

EFFECTS

PRODUCTS

ON

TiE

INTO THE

NUCLEAR REACTOR LOCATED AT LAGOONA BEACH,

MICHIGAN (Project No. 2506, Atomic Power Development Associates, Inc., Detroit.
Michigan) (1957) [hereinafter cited as GOMBERG REPORT].
58. The Savannah's reactor is rated at 69 Megawatts. See 1961 USAEC Majol
Activities 23-25.

59.

GOMBERG REPORT 3.

60. "Lapse rate: . . . Meteorological: The rate of decrease of atmospheric
temperature with increase of elevation vertically above a given location; Inversion:
A reversal in the normal temperature lapse rate, in which the temperature rises
with increased elevation, instead of falling." AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1961).
61. GOMIRERG REPORT 6. In the subject locale, the temperature inversion is
said to exist from 4 to 8 cumulative days per year.
62.

GOMISFRG RrIORT fig. 15.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss2/8

12

Brown: Nuclear
Ship Savannah and the Law
NO TES
Approximate Radius
from Site (Miles)

Approximate Total Dose
(Roentgens per 24 Hours)

45
75
150
450

1200
450
150
25

Under conditions of strong lapse, the radius downwind of the 400
roentgen dosage limit reaches ten miles from the site, while under
weak lapse, it reaches three miles. Under conditions of only one
per cent release, the inversion cycle would effect a 24 hour exposure of
400 roentgens over an area extending 7 miles from the site.
The inversion graph showing results from the more probable
release of particles instead of gas indicated a 450 roentgen total dose
per twenty-four hour exposure reaching a distance of 26.4 miles. 63
The report stated:64
"In terms of the airborne cloud effect, fallout under strong
inversion makes the problem of exposure due to airborne
activity less severe by a substantial margin.
"However, a new, longer range problem of cleanup is introduced since what is lost from the cloud is now on the
ground...."
The report in part revealed the following exposure results of fallout
of 10 micron particles under conditions of inversion weather and 100
per cent release:6 5
Radius from
Site (Miles)

24 Hour Exposure
(Roentgens)

12
25
50
100
175

1000
400
100
25

7 Day Exposure
(Roentgens)
1000
400
100
25

Even a one per cent particle release under inversion weather conditions would produce 24 hour doses of over 400 roentgens in areas
within two miles of the reactor and could produce 7 day exposure
of 400 roentgens in places 4 miles distant. Table I of the report

63.

GOiBERG REPORT 38.

64.

GOM BERG REPORT 40.

65.

GOMBERG REPORT 38 &

fig. 25.
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shows that under 100 per cent gaseous dispersion with the accident
occurring under inversion conditions, the city of Detroit, Michigan,
nearly 30 miles away, could have 50,000 to 133,000 people with an
exposure of at least 450 roentgens; 85,000 to 181,000 additional people
with exposures ranging from 150 to 450 roentgens; and 112,000 to
245,000 more people with exposures of between 25 and 150 roentgens. Thus it becomes evident that if the allegedly extremely remote
risk of a major reactor incident should occur, the results would be
appalling.
Fortunately there are only a few relatively minor incidents from
which the risk may be calibrated. Those few seem to illustrate the
uncertainties incident to the science in its present state, and serve
to indicate the more probable range of accident.
The SL-1 reactor accident at Idaho Falls National Laborator)
involved a unit of "conventional design, and of well-advanced technology ...

believed to be an 'inherently safe nuclear power plant.' ";13

At the time of the accident, the reactor had been shut down for
eleven days for maintenance. During the evening of January 3, 1961,
while three technicians were engaged in pre-start-up activities the
nuclear excursion occurred.67 All three men were killed. Fifteen
months after the fatal accident the official investigating Board could
only state that the accident was "probably caused by the 'unusuall)
rapid and extensive motion of the central control rod.' "61
On April 7, 1962, four men were hospitalized by a "criticality
accident" in the plutonium scrap recovery building at the AEC's
Hanford National Laboratory. "[A]pparently an overconcentration
of fissionable material collected in one of the waste tanks." 6.
In an accident at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, several workmen were
exposed to a heavy radiation dose when enriched uranium was accidentally transferred into a container of improper geometrical configuration and critical mass was thus achieved.7
In October 1957, at the Windscale installation in Cumberland,
England, overheated uranium rods in the reactor were thought to
have caused the release, despite stack filters, of a small quantity of
radioactive Iodine 131, which has a half-life of eight days. Land approximately 20 miles downwind of the installation was contaminated.
After a few clays, it was found that milk from cows grazing in the affec-

66.

BNA, A'io;,ic 1NDus. REi'. No. 293 V7:12 (1961).

67.

1961 USAEC MAJOR AcTiVITIES 141.

68.
69.

BNA, ATOMIC INDus REP. No. 358,8:113-114 (1962) (emphasis added.).
BNA, ATOMIC INDtS. RFP. No. 358 18:115 (1962) (emphasis added.).

70.

Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.. Forum Menso, Aug. 1958, pp. 39-40.
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ted fields was contaminated to an extent "six times the permissible
level." Corrective action included placing a "milk ban on some
1,000 dairy farms in the area" and the destruction of approximately
670,000 gallons of milk.71 Although the contamination was discovered
and apparently no one was harmed, the incident served to highlight
the terrible consequences which could occur if farm products ever
reached the market place with a radioactive content, without anyone perceiving of their dangerous propensities.72 How little material
is necessary to create serious disruption, was brought home forceably
in the case of American Alliance Insurance Co. v. Keleket,7 3 involving
an unexplained emission of finely powdered radium salt and radon
gas from a dosimeter calibration capsule the size of one's little finger
during a routine calibration. The results of this "tiny explosion"
74
have been described as follows:
"tTihe building where it took place could not be fully reopened for five months. For an even longer period certain businesses related to food, drink, or cosmetics could not operate
within the building. Expenses for decontamination were nearly
$250,000 and the city authorities would not allow the building
to be remodeled for fear that more radioactive material might
be uncovered."
Another example of the extent of possible damage was provided
by the accident of November 20, 1959, at Oak Ridge, when an explosion in a processing vessel during a clean-up procedure released
and spread about 6/10 of a gram of plutonium over buildings, vehicles
and roads in an area of about four acres. The cost of clean-up was
75
$350,000.
OPINIONS OF EXPERT WITNEssEs

The most experienced unit in the world today in the field of
nuclear marine propulsion is the AEC-United States Navy team.
Certain of their experts have issued candid warnings of trouble
71. Muldoon, Alice in Nuclear Energy Land, 42 MAss. L.Q., Dec. 1957, p. 9
(emphasis added.); see, 43 MAss. L.Q., March 1958, p. 38; Highton, The Legal
Aspects of the Development of Atomic Energy in the United Kingdom, 12 VAND.
L. REV. 223, 227 (1958).
72. Muldoon, supra note 71. With reference to the Windscale incident,
Muldoon suggests, "It is the foregoing type of situation which probably will
provide the most fruitful field for employment of implied warranty theories by
claimant's attorneys."
73. 248 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1957).
74. Note, 27 U. CiNc. L. REv. 415, 416 (1958).
75.

1960 USAEC MAJOR Acnivrrias 275.
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areas which would be well to keep under surveillance. Chairman
Chet Holifield, in his forward to the report of the JCAE meeting,
held April 9 and 10, 1961, cautioned the Navy to meet AEC safet)
standards in all aspects of its nuclear safety program and to resist
any pressures to force this new technology into an old system which
may have sufficed for ordinary propulsion.,' This admonition was
purposeful, for there had been a festering area of conflict between
the two authorities. The Navy tended towards allowing nuclear
submarine operators the same complete local control exercised in
conventional submarine operations. For example, Admiral Rickover
testified before the JCAE at this meeting:-"When the time came to test the Seawolf, our second nuclearpowered submarine, we were faced with a more serious problem. The Seawolf's reactor was cooled with sodium, which was
far more radioactive than the water coolant of the Nautilus.
The Reactor Safeguards Committee never did fully approve
operation of the ship into populous ports. They finally agreed,
for military reasons, that the ship could operate out of Key
West, which is a submarine base. But the operating forces
objected to this limitation, and, on their own, decided to move
the Seawolf into populated ports without referring the matter
to us or to the Reactor Safeguards Committee.
"It took a great deal of doing and a lot of argument before
they finally realized the) must not move these ships arotnd
the way they were accustomed to move conventional ships. We
still have that fight, even though Admiral Burke has issued instructions to the Navy that nuclear-powered ships must be
treated in a special way, and that there must be an actual
military or national necessity before a nuclear ship can go
into a populated harbor. In my opinion, the spirit of this
order is not always being lived up to fully. That is, they write
and say it is a 'military necessity'. And the argument I put up
is, 'What if something happens and you irradiate a city . . .?"
'Well,' they answer, 'nothing is going to happen.' This is the
sort of situation we are up against because the nuclear plants
have operated so well to date. . . . ITihe more reactors there
are operating, the more serious is the problem, because the
chance of something happening multiplies with the number
of reactors. . . . I am more concerned than ever because the

76. Hearings on Naval Reactor Pr-ogram and Polaiis Missile System. Befoie
Tile Joint Comnllee on Atonic Energy, 86th C.ong., 2d Sess., %i (1960) 1hereinafter cited as 1960 Naval Reactor ilearingsl.
77. 1960 Naval Reactor Hearings 19-21 (emphasis added.).
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more reactors there are, the more people are involved, and
'
you can't keep as tight control as when there were only a few." 8
The Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, wrote
to the Chairman, AEC, on August 5, 1958:79
"The Advisory Committee . . . wishes to point out that nu-

clear-powered ships are not completely free from presenting
a possible hazard to the public. There exists an ever-present
low-level risk of release of radioactivity .

. .

. The problem

assumes increasing importance as the number of nuclearpowered ships increases."
A further letter in the same vein was written on November
12, 1958, in which the Chairman, ACRS, stated:80
"The Navy's desire to bring nuclear submarines into various
populous ports has resulted in considerably more of such
operations than the Committee had envisioned when it first
commented upon nuclear submarine operation. The Committee wishes to repeat the point which it has emphasized on
previous occasions that the entry of nuclear ships into populous
ports cannot yet be considered routine or entirely without risk."
Split responsibility similar to that which concerned the JCAE in
connection with the Navy, is also present with the Savannah, for
after a struggle for control among Congressional committees in 1955,
the issue was settled in 1956 by parcelling out jurisdiction over the
ship between the AEC and the Maritime Commission, and among
the JCAE, the Senate Commerce, and the House Merchant Marine
Committee.81 One cannot but wonder if the pressure of political

78. "The most dangerous element in all operations is the human element."
TFLLER 9- LATTER, OUR NUCLEAR FUTURE 51 (1958).
79. 1959 REACTOR SAFEGUARDS REPORT 71. "[I]nterest in nuclear propulsion

...

is being shown in: Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Norway, France, Italy, The
Netherlands, Sweden . . . [and] West Germany: The Federal Atomic Ministry
announced its OMR prototype reactor would be installed in a tanker, the ESSO
Bolivar .... The Warvow yard at Rostok is expected to have the first East German nuclear powered ship by 1965. It may be a smaller river craft ..... . 5
USAEC, REvImw OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS OF THE

U.S. 1910 (1960). Volume one of this review indicates that the "Soviet icebreaker
Lenin operates under nuclear power .... " The Soviet Union is also reportedly
making plans for a 60,000 ton nuclear tanker. Florida Times-Union, April 23,
1962, p. IA, col. 3.
80. 1960 Naval ReactorHearings 17.
81. See Note, 59 MICH. L. REv. 438, 440 (1961); Green & Rosenthal, A Study
of Fusion of Governmental Power, JCAE Study Project (1961).
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expediency and cold war maneuverings, abetted by a false confidence
nurtured by an exemplary safety record, and stimulated by paternal
pride in the prodigy Savannah, has thrust her prematurely upon the
stage.
SAVANNAH

GOES "A'PoRTING"

To develop in-port acceptance agreements for the NS Savannah,
representatives of the AEC and the United States Maritime Administration have met with nuclear, maritime and public health officials
of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Negotiations have been "progressing satisfactorily in matters related
to general operating conditions, safety evaluation and inspection,"
but the conclusion of "acceptance indemnity arrangements continues
to present problems which it is hoped can be resolved through mutual
82
effort."
Negotiations with the United Kingdom had reached a point where
it was necessary for the United States negotiators to have authoritN
to (1) submit to suit in the United Kingdom courts without an
assertion of sovereign immunity from suit, and (2) to waive the conventional shipowner's limit of liability. Other areas of divergence
arose from the desire of the United Kingdom representatives that
the United States (3) admit absolute liability, (4) accept exclusive
liability, and (5) agree not to assert the defense of the statute of
limitations for a period of ten years after any nuclear incident involving the Savannah in United Kingdom waters.83 After suggested
solutions indicated promise, they proved unacceptable, and negotiations bogged down.s4
The first in-port acceptance agreement for the Savannah was concluded with Greece on June 12, 1962.s5
LOCAL POWER To REGULATE: THE CITY OF DETROIT CASE

The question of whether or not a domestic port authority may
unilaterally deny entrance to a nuclear-powered ship has not been
resolved. A somewhat allied question was recently adjudicated in
Huron Portland Cement Company v. City of Detroit,86 where a municipal smoke abatement ordinance was held to have been violated
82. 1961 USAEC MAJOR AcTIVITIES 229.
83. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Research and Development and
the Subcommittees on Radiation of the JCAE, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 276
(1960).
84. USAEC News Release, No. IN-198, April 13, 1961.
85. USAEC News Release, No. E-198, June 12, 1962.
86. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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by appellant's ships. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's refusal to enjoin the city from prosecuting appellant
for violation of the ordinance. The Court pointed out that in the
exercise of the police power through legislation benefiting the
health and welfare of their inhabitants, states and their instrumentalities may act concurrently with the federal government in many
areas of interstate and maritime activities. It added that "evenhanded local regulation to effect a legitimate local interest is valid
unless preempted by federal action" or "unless unduly burdensome
on maritime activities or interstate commerce .... ."87 The Court
held that the purpose of federal inspection statutes is to insure the
seagoing safety of vessels subject to inspection. The federal laws
are clearly limited to protecting passengers and crews from the
perils of maritime navigation.
"By contrast," said the Court, "the sole aim of the Detroit ordinance is elimination of air pollution to protect the health and enhance the cleanliness of the local community."88 The Court held
that there is no overlap between the federal ship inspection laws and
the municipal ordinance, and asserted that the federal inspection
legislation had not pre-empted local action.
The appellant also argued that the fact that the vessels were
actually licensed and enrolled by the national government gave them
a right to use the navigable waters of the United States free from
the local impediment imposed by the Detroit ordinance. The Court
answered that while a state could not exclude from its waters a ship
operating under a federal license, nor require an additional local
occupational license as a condition precedent to use of its waters,
still "the mere possession of a federal license does not immunize a
ship from normal incidents of local police power"8 9 which of themselves do not constitute a direct regulation of commerce. Thus a
ship is not exempted from local pilotage laws, local quarantine laws,
local safety inspections, or local regulation of wharves and docks.
Mr. Justice Stewart's majority opinion pointed out that the Detroit
ordinance did not exclude a licensed vessel from the Port of Detroit,
nor did it destroy the right of free passage. It merely required compliance with an orderly and reasonable scheme of community regulation not so burdensome either on the federal licensee or on interstate
commerce as to be constitutionally invalid.
Disregarding for a moment any indications of Congressional intent evidenced by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and by
the enabling legislation for the Savannah, it might appear possible
87. 562 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
88. 362 U.S. 440, 445 (1960).
89. 362 U.S. 440, 447 (1960).
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for a judiciously and generally worded municipal ordinance to so
adapt the "air pollution" reasoning, and the Court's opinion on the
purpose and limited thrust of the federal boiler inspection code, that
the restrictions could apply to nuclear ships and still fall under the
rule of the Detroit case. However, it would seem impossible to avoid
the major pre-emption argument that by appropriating funds for the
Savannah and extending Price-Anderson coverage to her, Congress
indicated its desire that nuclear ships have access to domestic ports.
Bilateral treaties for in-port acceptance of the Savannah, unless reciprocity was expressly denied, would further substantiate this allegation of intent. Furthermore, such an ordinance would be applied
against a nuclear ship to prevent a theoretical condition from developing, while in the City of Detroit case there was a present violation
causing actual damage. In acting against a mere potential risk, the
theoretical ordinance would presumably land directly astride the
federal safety inspection assessing the same risk and finding it
tolerable. Consequently there seems to be little possibility that the
holding of the City of Detroit case could be extended to permit local
legislation to restrict entry of nuclear ships into domestic ports. Such
ordinances also would probably run afoul of the constitutional priority
given treaties, as nuclear ships under foreign flags visit us in consequence of bilateral agreements now being negotiated.
In the apparent absence of any legal means to bar nuclear ships
from local ports, one is relegated to questioning legislators and administrators about the reasonableness of federal restrictions which
tend to locate land-based reactors in areas of minimal population
density, while denying to heavily-populated port areas the privilege
of providing for themselves the same degree of protection against
floating reactors. One might further question whether interstate commerce is not adequately served, at least for the present, by conventional shipping. Experimental development of nuclear propulsion
does not demand the exposure of heavy population centers to even
remote risks, and a better method could be found for conducting the
necessary experiments than to perform them in the midst of congested port areas.
There has been some suggestion on the part of the AEC 90 that
if nuclear ships are to achieve economic feasibility, their turn-around
time must be greatly reduced. One method for accomplishing this
would be to restrict cargoes to fast unloading products such as oil. A
more speculative approach, which would help to solve the risk
problem while it affects efficiencies is the "piggy-back" technique.
Under this system, the nuclear engine would be installed in a power90.

1 USAEC,

REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL

ATOMIC POLICIES AND

PROGRAM

OF THE U.S. 51 (1960).
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unit, or "sea-tractor," which would shuttle back and forth between
strategically and logistically located floating terminals, moving "trains"
of surface or submarine barges designed to accommodate certain cargoes. By this method, maximum utilization of the propulsion unit
could be achieved, through nearly continuous operation, while the
cargo units could benefit by simplicity of design. At the same time,
civilian population and property at port areas would not be jeopardized by the haunting shadow of nuclear excursion.
Perhaps the real solution was pointed out by Admiral Rickover,
when he said: "It took a great deal of doing.., before they finally
realized they must not move these ships around the way they were
accustomed to move conventional ships." 91
THE TEXAS CITY INCIDENT

When beset with perplexities, the law seeks answers in its precedents. The major problem with which all are concerned in connection with nuclear shipping is the accidental irradiation of a heavily
populated area. While there has been no comparable peacetime
situation, there is one recent actual case from which we can glean
some concept of our reaction to such a catastrophe. This was the
Texas City disaster in 1946, when supposedly inert fertilizer exploded while being loaded aboard the French Ship Grandcamp,
causing, together with the resultant fires, 540 deaths, several thousand injuries, and millions of dollars worth of property damage. A
number of claims from this tragedy were ultimately consolidated into
a class suit filed against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act of 1946.92 The claimants sought to connect the federal
government through the twin facts that the fertilizer was manufactured by the United States and was being loaded by United States
stevedores.
After seven years, final decision was reached, the United States
Supreme Court, in Dalehite v. U.S.93 affirming the lower court's decision that the United States was not liable because certain pertinent
acts of the government were within the discretionary function exception of the Tort Claims Act.
As an aftermath of the Dalehite decision, Congress enacted in
1955 the Texas City Relief Act 94 pursuant to which payments were

made to uninsured claimants in an amount not to exceed $25,000 per
claim. The act reads in part:9 5
91. 1960 Naval ReactorHearing 19.
92. 28 U.S.C. §2671 (1958).
93. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). But see Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
94. 69 Stat. 707 (1955).
95. 69 Stat. 707 §1 (1955).
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"Congress recognizes and assumes the compassionate responsibility of the United States for the losses sustained by reason ol
the explosions and fires at Texas City, Texas, and hereby
provides the procedure by which the amounts shall be determined and paid.... "
Under the act, approximately $16 million was paid to victims
of the disaster in exchange for assignment of their claims totaling
nearly $70 million.
It appears obvious that the decision to pay the claims was not
demanded by established law, but was felt to be morally necessary.
Similar thinking, tinted in overtones of economics, politics, and
diplomacy, gave rise to Price-Anderson, and seems to permeate the
thinking of the various European and international groups concerned with nuclear power. Thus a pattern is emerging which overrides existing legal concepts and provides indemnity without fault.
on a governmental level.
On the other hand, by the time the innocent victims of Texas
City received initial payments, some eight years after the accident,
many injured children had grown up, graduated from college, or
married. To the injured victim there is little difference between a
moral obligation ignored and one performed after the real need for
help has passed. Consideration should be given to the question of
settlement delays if the pro-rata clause of Price-Anderson should ever
have to be invoked. And since, in such a case, funded settlements will
be only proportional, thought should be given to other means b)
which the victims can be made whole. Basically involved will be
the needs for food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and honest employment. Perhaps some other form of governmental relief will be
required in addition to dollar payments, the traditional legal solution to "accidents." Accident-orientation and disaster-orientation are
not to be confused, if each is to function effectively.
INTERNATIONAL AND MARITIME AsPEc-rs

in recent years United States delegates have participated in a
series of international panels and conferences having to do with
nuclear shipping. In September 1959, the International Maritime
Committee met in Rijeka, Yugoslavia, to draft conventions on liability of ship operatorse This preliminary work, together with a
list of proposals developed by the British Minister of Transport

96. Berman & Hydeman, International Control of the Safety of NuclearPowered Merchant Ships, 59 Mwfn. L. RFV.

233, 236 (1960)

(hereinafter cited

as Berman & Hydeman).
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Committee in February 1960, 97 was in turn studied at the June 1960
London Conference, which met to develop revisions in the 1948
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. 98 Mr. Seavers, reporting on
this meeting, stated: 99
"Our committee decided against recommending rules that
would single out nuclear ships and restrict their movements.
It was also decided that there was not a need to hang a
'leper's bell' on these vessels by requiring that they have a
special identification such as a coat of red paint. Instead,
it was concluded that prudent navigation by all ships, in accordance with the time-honored Rules of the Road, will provide protection at least as fully as could be done by special
rules for nuclear ships that might inhibit progress in this
field ......
No coat of red paint would be necessary to enable any competent
ship's officer to identify the Savannah or any other ship. Visual
identification, if other means have not already accomplished recognition, would be made by recognizing a ship's silhouette long before
its color would be visible. Nor would identifying marks of any
kind have been nearly as adequate as simple restriction from heavilytrafficked shipping lanes, to prevent the collision which occurred on
May 10, 1962, thirty miles off the Golden Gate, when the Hawaiian
Citizen collided with the "sail" of the submerged nuclear-powered
submarine Permit.100 The submarine immediately surfaced and proceded to Mare Island Naval Base, refusing Coast Guard inspection
enroute on the theory that the accident occurred outside Coast Guard
jurisdiction. A Mare Island spokesman later announced that the
submarine had incurred only slight damage, and that the reactor
had not been affected. He also made what has come to be a virtually
routine statement whenever reactors have been connected with endangering difficulties, a demulcent announcement that even under a
more violent collision there would have been "no possibility of a
nuclear explosion."''11 Given the Gomberg report circumstances of
100 per cent emission during inversion weather, one might suspect
that the fine distinction between explosion and release would be
somewhat academic to the area's inhabitants.
97. See Berman &Hydeman 239; see Seavers 180.
98. Berman &Hydeman 239.
99. Seavers 179.
100. Florida Times-Union, May 11, 1962, p. 4A, col. 4. The Savannah escaped
being rammed by the destroyer Stickell by a hairbreadth two feet in the narrow
Hampton Roads channel on Aug. 30, 1962. Gainesville [Fla.] Daily Sun, Aug. 31,
1962, p. 1, col. 2.
101. Ibid.
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In reporting on the International Maritime Committee's Rijeka
draft, Mr. Seavers says: 102
"The imposition of strict liability on the operator, with the
right of recourse severely restricted, and contributory negligence allowed as a defense only in case of wilful acts, if at all,
is central to the pattern that has emerged from the various
studies and debates .... Actually, a provision in the convention and implementing legislation imposing strict liability
would, in the opinion of many, be a codification of what the
courts would do in any case.
"[I]t is equally safe to predict that today the courts would not
permit the owner the benefit of the admiralty doctrine which,
in various countries, limits the liability of the shipowner to
the value of the vessel, a sum based on the tonnage of the ship,
or a combination of these. A prerequisite to the right to limit
is the absence of privity with or knowledge of the cause of
the damage, on the part of the owner. It is no secret to the
owner that his ship is equipped with a nuclear reactor."
Various other organizations of recent origin are grappling with
the problems of nuclear energy. As the result of work done by
ENEA, 10 3 a specialized agency of the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation, the OEEC committee members on July 29,
1960 signed, subject to ratification by all 18 member nations, an
international convention regarding third party liability in the field
of nuclear energy. 0 4 This convention provided for imposition of
liability without fault on the operators of reactors and other nuclear
facilities, required all operators to carry liability insurance and extended the statutes of limitations to ten years. 10 5 It also provided for
abolition of any liability in excess of $15 million with any signatory
nation given the discretion to reduce this amount to S5 million.106
Under such limits national emergency relief measures would be an
obvious necessity in the event of a major nuclear incident. 10 7
In April 1961 a committee of the International Atomic Energy
Agency

(IAEA), which represents 82 nations, issued a number of

102. Seavers 184.
103. European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA).
104.

1 USEAC, REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
(1960).
CCH ATOMIC ENERGY INT'L AcrIlVITIES 17517 (Jan. 3, 1961).
Ibid.
See Cavers, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
12 VAND. L. REv. 17, 44 (1958).

OF THE U.S. 11

105.
106.
107.
Energy,
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08
recommended nuclear safety and liability policies, which included:

(1) the imposition of absolute liability for property damage
or personal injury from nuclear incidents, without requiring
proof of fault or negligence, but requiring proof of causation;
(2) the concentration of liability in the operator of the installation responsible for the damage;
(3) the requirement that all liability for nuclear damage
should be covered by adequate insurance or other financial
security, with each state to determine the distribution of indemnity responsibility between private coverage and state intervention;
(4) a definite limitation on the amount of liability to be
established by each state, of at least a minimum figure to be
established by convention, the state to have discretion as to
actual limits above this amount; and
(5) the establishment of jurisdiction over actions regarding
nuclear damage exclusively with the courts of the state in
which the causative installation is located, or, as to goods in
transit, of the state of incidence.
On April 17, 1962, the Diplomatic Conference of Maritime Law
began in Brussels. 10 9 Mr. Sterling Cole, director general of IAEA
suggested that the governments licensing nuclear ships be required
to provide indemnity during the formative period of nuclear ship
development, since it was improbable that nuclear ship operators
could otherwise provide adequate indemnity coverage. A working
paper report by IAEA's Panel on Liability for Nuclear Ships proposed that the operators of nuclear ships be held absolutely liable
for damage attributable to such ship's nuclear character, and that
fault or negligence on the part of the ship operator need not be
established by the claimant. The panel agreed that liability should
be limited in amount and that it should be shared in cases where
damage derives from either two or more nuclear incidents, or from
one incident involving the operators of two or more nuclear ships.
The panel suggested that the liability limit be based on a theoretical
public exposure risk rather than on the amount of insurance coverage
available on the world market, and that the limit be uniform in all
signatory states." Although final action of the Brussels conference
had not been announced when this note was written, proposals being
108. BNA, AToMIc INDUS. REP. ff7:127 (1961).
109. BNA, AToMiC INDUS. REP. ff7:136 (1961).
110. Ibid.
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considered as to liability limits ranged from $100 million recommended by Euratom to $125 million which is approximately the
same amount as that in the German nuclear energy legislation, and
which figure seems favored by the United States.'1 1
There is a marked spread between the Price-Anderson indemnity
figure of $500 million and the figures being considered at Brussels.
Apparently the larger figure is thought by many nations to be either
unsound or unreachable. A situation could conceivably arise wherein a foreign treaty ship covered by only $100 million suffered a
serious nuclear accident in a United States port, resulting in damages
and injuries which would reach even the prorational levels under
our act. In this case our citizens would be submitted to the greater
risk incident to visitation of a ship over the safety of which we exercise little control but they would be protected by only one-fifth the
security provided for risks attendant to our own ships, concerning
which complete information is available. It seems improbable that
such a condition would be tolerated.
If such shipping is to be readily accepted in the major ports of all
nations, adequate indemnity protection must be assured. Rather
than to pursue the arduous and problematical effort to achieve bilateral or multilateral agreement on satisfactory indemnity procedures
and limits between negotiating states, with the variances which could
develop and with the objections which might well be voiced by nonsignatory states which stood to incur risks which they were not willing
to accept directly for themselves, it would seem that a different approach might be in order. Perhaps the solution most sound, most
fair, and most easily attainable would be the formation of an international indemnity pool, with each participating nation assigned
by formula a percentage of responsibility for any claim which developed. This would give the opportunity for participation to even
those nations which, though not maritime states themselves, would
be exposed to risks and therefore entitled to indemnity. Thus any
catastrophic occurrence, regardless of where it took place, would be
handled on the basis of actual needs rather than funding capacity,
with the advantage of spreading the costs to the world economy, which
in turn would tend to make nuclear shipping an international asset,
rather than an exclusive possession of the larger powers. No major
funds would be required for such a venture, and conceivably arrangements could be made for participation of the insurance industry
on an international level.
CONCLUSION

Vice or virtue, we have embraced the risks of nuclear propulsion.
111.

BNA, AroMic

INDUS. REP.

7:136 (1961); Seavers 185-86.
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Efforts should now be bent toward enjoying the benefits as soon as
possible, but by means that soberly take into account the attendant
risks. Pressures exist which tend to emphasize the similarities and to
neglect the distinctions between nuclear and conventional methods
of propulsion. Those pressures, if not countered by continued evaluation and adaptation, and if not buffered by far-sighted thinking,
may result ultimately in delay in achieving the very goals desired.
There seems to be no imperative peacetime need to plunge into the
everyday operation of nuclear-propelled merchant shipping with an
urgency which might increase unnecessarily the risks to the citizens
of our port cities. Had the ordinary citizen his say in the matter, he
might just as soon wait a bit, and gauge his acceptance of this new
force on proven reliability and necessity. But if he is to be a pawn
to progress, he at least has the right to expect that if he should be
injured, or his property denied him or destroyed, compensation and
aid commensurate with his needs will be made available. The civic
leaders and officials to whom he entrusts his security owe him the
obligation not themselves to be lulled into docility by reassuring pronouncements or tempted by promotional enticements. The advantages should be weighed against the risks, and the conclusions arrived at soberly. The long-run solutions may be found in such possibilities as nuclear-shipping industrial parks situated to minimize
the hazards to the state's population, 1 2 off-shore terminals, and nuclear sea-tractors. Until such solutions are perfected, thought should
be given to just what procedures will be followed if a ship does "irradiate a city."' 13
JAMES MILTON BROWN

112. One location which might be considered for such an enterprise is the
Suwannee River sector of the Florida Gulf Coast.
113. 1960 Naval Reactor Hearings 19.
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